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1 
Distilling Ashcroft: The Ninth Circuit’s Application of 
National Community Standards to Internet Obscenity 
in United States v. Kilbride 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Kilbride1 
highlights a circuit split regarding the application of the Miller v. 
California2 test for determining whether a work is obscene in the 
context of sexually explicit material disseminated via the Internet. It 
has long been held that obscene material “is not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech or press.”3 The Miller test indicates 
that in determining if material is obscene, a trier of fact must 
consider, among other things, “whether the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”4 Lower courts have split 
over the difficult task of determining whether a national or local 
community standard should be applied to sexually explicit material 
transmitted over the Internet. The most recent Supreme Court case 
related to this issue, Ashcroft v. ACLU,5 left the Court highly divided 
and gave the lower courts little guidance. Since Ashcroft, circuit 
courts have continued to apply different community standards to  
sexually explicit Internet material.6 In Kilbride, the Ninth Circuit 
“distill[ed] the various opinions in Ashcroft” and held that a national 
community standard must be applied in regulating Internet 
obscenity.7 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit in Kilbride incorrectly 
applied the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Ashcroft. The 
court failed to properly apply Miller’s clear preference that local 
community standards be applied in obscenity cases. Instead, the 
 
 1. 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 2. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 3. Id. at 21 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957)). 
 4. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24) (emphasis added). 
 5. 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 6. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(unpublished decision) (rejecting the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Kilbride).  
 7. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255. 
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Ninth Circuit distinguished Miller and its progeny by asserting that 
“speech disseminated via email is distinguishable from . . . speech 
disseminated via regular mails or telephone . . . because there is no 
means to control where geographically their messages will be 
received.”8 Further, the Ninth Circuit improperly applied Ashcroft by 
“distill[ing] . . . the various opinions [of Ashcroft]”9 to create a 
piecemealed holding.  
Part II of this Note describes the facts and procedural history of 
Kilbride. Part III explains and describes the relevant legal 
background against which the court decided Kilbride. Part IV 
outlines the court’s reasoning and decision in Kilbride. Finally, part 
V analyzes Kilbride as described above. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Facts of the Case 
Jeffrey Kilbride and James Schaffer (collectively “Kilbride”) 
began an email advertising business in 2003.10 In response to new 
email regulations, Kilbride transferred the business overseas by using 
servers in the Netherlands and running the business through a 
Mauritian company, Ganymede Marketing.11 Kilbride profited from 
the business by receiving a commission every time a recipient of the 
company’s emails followed a link to an advertised website and paid a 
fee to use the website.12 Kilbride’s emails included sexually explicit 
images that formed the basis for the obscenity convictions in this 
case.13 
To help mask the operation, Kilbride directed company 
employees to use various techniques to place fictitious and 
nonsensical information in place of the correct domain name and 
“From” field of the unsolicited emails.14 Additionally, Kilbride 
falsified the registration of domain names the company used by  
 
 
 
 8. Id. at 1251. 
 9. Id. at 1255. 
 10. Id. at 1244. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1244–45. 
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listing incorrect mailing addresses, non-functional email addresses, 
and fake entity names.15  
B. Procedural History 
Kilbride was indicted on various counts on August 25, 2005.16 
Included in the indictment was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462 for 
interstate transportation of obscene materials and a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1465 for interstate transportation of obscene materials for 
sale.17 At trial, the sexually explicit images from Kilbride’s emails 
were introduced, and a company employee testified that the images 
were sent out in connection with Kilbride’s email advertising.18 In 
arguing that the images were obscene, the government called eight 
witnesses who testified that they had received sexually explicit images 
from Kilbride and expressed their views as to those messages.19 
Additionally, the government was able to present over 662,000 
complaints sent to the Federal Trade Commission regarding 
Kilbride’s emails.20 
In instructing the jury as to the Miller test, the judge said, 
regarding contemporary community standards: 
[Contemporary community standards involve] what is in fact 
accepted in the community as a whole; that is to say by society at 
large, or people in general, and not merely by what the community 
tolerates nor by what some persons or groups of persons may 
believe the community as a whole ought to accept or refuse to 
accept. . . . The community . . . is not defined by a precise 
geographic area. . . . You should consider the evidence presented, 
but you may also consider your own experience and judgment in 
determining contemporary community standards.21 
The jury found that the images used in Kilbride’s emails were 
obscene and convicted Kilbride of violating the obscenity statutes.22  
 
 
 15. Id. at 1245. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. These statutes will be referred to collectively as the “obscenity statutes.” 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1248 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Id. at 1244. 
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Kilbride was given a prison sentence of more than four years.23 
Kilbride then appealed the conviction to the Ninth Circuit.24 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Obscenity Law Prior to Ashcroft 
1. The three-pronged Miller test 
In Miller the Supreme Court articulated the current test for 
determining whether sexually explicit speech rises to the level of 
unprotected obscenity. Miller involved the unsolicited mailing of 
adult advertising material.25 To determine whether the material was 
legally obscene, the Court employed a three-pronged test. Prong 
one required the trier of fact to determine “whether ‘the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”26 
Based on this standard, the Court held that it was permissible for the 
jury to apply the contemporary community standards of California to 
the material at issue.27 In buttressing the use of local community 
standards, the Court stated that: “To require a State to structure 
obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national ‘community 
standard’ would be an exercise in futility.”28 Further, the Court 
reasoned that “our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this 
Court to reasonably expect that such [national] standards could be 
articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation.”29 However, the 
Court did not hold that use of a national standard would be wholly 
unpermitted, only that “[n]othing . . . requires that a jury must 
consider hypothetical and unascertainable ‘national standards.’”30 
2. Miller’s progeny 
Following Miller, the Court continued to hold that a local 
community standard would survive constitutional scrutiny. For 
 
 23. Id. at 1245. 
 24. Id. at 1247. 
 25. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973). 
 26. Id. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). 
 27. See id. at 31. 
 28. Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 31. 
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instance, in Hamling v. United States, the Court considered whether 
applying community standards to a federal statute that prohibited 
the mailing of obscene material was constitutional.31 The Court held 
that the statute “is not to be interpreted as requiring proof of 
uniform national standards which were criticized in Miller.”32 The 
Court reasoned that “[t]he fact that distributors of allegedly obscene 
materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the 
various federal judicial districts into which they transmit the materials 
does not render a federal statute unconstitutional.”33 Thus, the 
Court rejected the argument that a local community standard 
unconstitutionally forced “speakers . . . to tailor their messages to 
the least tolerant community.”34 
The Court reaffirmed the holding of Hamling fifteen years later 
in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC.35 In Sable, a 
federal statute prohibiting obscene or indecent commercial 
telephone calls was upheld against a challenge asserting that the 
statute’s use of local community standards unconstitutionally forced 
“message senders . . . to tailor all their messages to the least tolerant 
community.”36 In upholding the statute, the Court relied on 
Hamling and stated that: “If Sable’s audience is comprised of 
different communities with different local standards, Sable ultimately 
bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene 
messages.”37 Both Hamling and Sable established the rule that a 
distributor of sexually explicit material may attempt to tailor its 
message to specific communities, but that the distributor nonetheless 
bears the ultimate burden of complying with the varying local 
community standards.38 
B. The Uncertainty of Ashcroft 
The issue before the Supreme Court in Ashcroft was “whether 
the Child Online Protection Act’s (COPA) use of ‘community 
standards’ to identify ‘material that is harmful to minors’ violate[d] 
 
 31. 418 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1974). 
 32. Id. at 105. 
 33. Id. at 106. 
 34. Id. But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 580–81 (2002). 
 35. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
 36. Id. at 124. 
 37. Id. at 126. 
 38. See id.; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106.  
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the First Amendment.”39 The purpose of COPA was to “restrict[] 
minors’ access to pornographic material on the Internet.”40 To 
restrict minors’ access to pornography, COPA “prohibit[ed] . . . 
‘mak[ing] any communication for commercial purposes that is 
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful 
to minors.’”41 COPA defined “material that is harmful to minors,” in 
part, by borrowing the “contemporary community standards” prong 
of the Miller test.42 Thus, although Ashcroft dealt with child 
pornography, an area subject to more stringent rules than traditional 
obscenity cases,43 it presented the Court with an opportunity to 
review the Miller “contemporary community standards” prong. 
In a highly divisive decision, a majority of the Court held that 
“COPA’s reliance on community standards . . . does not by itself . . . 
render the statute substantially overbroad.”44 Although a majority of 
the Court agreed that application of local community standards did 
not render COPA overbroad, five separate opinions discussed the 
relative merits of using national, as opposed to local, community 
standards.  
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia, rejected the proposition that national standards must be 
applied to sexually explicit Internet material.45 Instead, they found 
that the reasoning in Hamling and Sable should apply to the Internet 
the same as it does to other forms of communication, including mail 
and phone.46 Thus, they stated that “[i]f a publisher chooses to send 
its material into a particular community, this Court’s jurisprudence 
teaches that it is the publisher’s responsibility to abide by that 
community’s standard.”47 To this group of Justices, a publisher of  
sexually explicit material should bear the risk of violating a given 
locality’s community standards, even if that publisher “distribute[s] 
its material to every community in the Nation.”48 
 
 39. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 566. 
 40. Id. at 569. 
 41. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (Supp. V 1994)). 
 42. See id. at 570 (second quotation quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
 43. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002); New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
 44. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585 (emphasis omitted). 
 45. Id. at 583. 
 46. See id. at 581–83. 
 47. Id. at 583. 
 48. Id. 
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Justice O’Connor, although joining Justice Thomas’s opinion in 
part, “wr[o]te separately to express [her] views on the . . . 
desirability of adopting a national standard for obscenity for 
regulation of the Internet.”49 Justice O’Connor found it to “be 
entirely too much to ask” to “expect[] [speakers] to bear the burden 
of controlling the recipients of their speech,” as was required in 
Hamling and Sable.50 Justice O’Connor based this conclusion on the 
“speakers’ inability to control the geographic location of their 
audience.”51 However, Justice O’Connor did recognize the 
skepticism of the Miller Court towards a national standard and 
acknowledged that “jurors . . . will inevitably base their assessments 
[of obscenity] to some extent on their experience of their local 
communities.”52 
Justice Breyer wrote separately because of his belief that 
Congress intended the word “community,” as used in COPA, “to 
refer to the Nation’s adult community taken as a whole.”53 Justice 
Breyer cited to a section of a House of Representatives report to 
confirm that opinion.54 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, 
wrote separately to articulate his concern that “[t]he national 
variation in community standards constitutes a particular burden on 
Internet speech.”55 However, Justice Kennedy noted that “[i]n any 
event, we need not decide whether the statute invokes local or 
national community standards.”56 Additionally, Justice Kennedy 
rejected Justice Breyer’s use of legislative history as support for a 
national community standard by saying: “[T]here is no reason to 
believe that [the statement cited by Justice Breyer] reflects the view 
of a majority of the House of Representatives.”57 
 
 49. Id. at 586 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 50. Id. at 587. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 589. 
 53. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 54. See id. at 590 (“The Committee recognizes that the applicability of community 
standards in the context of the Web is controversial, but understands it as an ‘adult’ standard, 
rather than a ‘geographic’ standard, and one that is reasonably constant among adults in 
America with respect to what is suitable for minors.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 105-775, at 28 (1998))). 
 55. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 56. Id. at 596. 
 57. Id. 
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Finally, Justice Stevens, in dissent, rejected outright the use of 
local community standards in Internet obscenity cases because “[i]n 
the context of the Internet . . . community standards become a 
sword, rather than a shield.”58 Justice Stevens found that use of 
community standards in an Internet obscenity context “has ‘the 
intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country 
access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might 
be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of 
decency.’”59 
The uncertainty that Ashcroft left in its wake has led to the 
current split among circuit courts as to whether local or national 
community standards should apply in determining whether sexually 
explicit material transmitted over the Internet is obscene.60 
C. Lower Court Attempts to Apply Ashcroft 
The Eleventh Circuit noted in a recent decision the conflict 
between the circuits as to the issue of whether to apply local or 
national community standards to the Internet.61 On one side, the 
Eleventh Circuit has continued to hold that application of a local 
community standard to the sexually explicit material distributed via 
the Internet is constitutionally permissible.62 The Court’s 
justification for this approach is that “the Miller contemporary 
community standard remains the standard by which the Supreme 
Court has directed us to judge obscenity, on the Internet and 
elsewhere.”63 On the other side, the Ninth Circuit, as shown below, 
has held that national standards should apply to material 
disseminated via the Internet.64 
  
 
 58. Id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 605 (quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962)). 
 60. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(unpublished decision) (noting the alternative approach taken by the Ninth Circuit). 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Kilbride challenged the district 
court’s ruling by arguing that the judge improperly instructed the 
jury as to the definition of obscenity under the obscenity statutes.65 
Specifically, Kilbride argued that “obscenity disseminated via email 
must be defined according to a national community standard” and 
not by a local community standard.66 Kilbride asserted that a local 
community standard allows a juror to “draw on knowledge of the 
community or vicinage from which he comes”67 and impermissibly 
burdens protected speech because it “unavoidably subjects [sexually 
explicit Internet material] to the standards of the least tolerant 
community in the country.”68 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Kilbride. However, the court did 
not reverse the district court’s decision because “the district court’s 
error was far from plain. . . . While [the Ninth Circuit’s] holding . . . 
follows directly from a distillation of the various opinions in Ashcroft, 
[its] conclusion was far from clear and obvious to the district court.”69 
A. The Court’s Distinguishing of Hamling and Sable 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished sexually explicit material 
disseminated via the Internet from material disseminated via 
traditional mail or phone.70 The court acknowledged that Hamling 
and Sable established that the burden of compliance with the 
contemporary community standards prong of Miller rested with the 
distributor of the alleged obscenity.71 However, the court agreed 
with Kilbride that material disseminated via email was fundamentally 
different than speech disseminated via traditional mail or telephone 
 
 65. Kilbride made two arguments regarding the jury instructions. First, he argued that 
the jury instructions were impermissible because “they impermissibly allowed the jurors to rely 
on standards outside their own community.” Id. at 1248. In the alternative, Kilbride argued, 
as discussed below, that national community standards should be used instead of local 
community standards. Id. at 1250. The Ninth Circuit’s key holding came out of an analysis of 
Kilbride’s second argument. Id. at 1250–55. This Note will consider only Kilbride’s second 
argument that national standards should be used in place of local standards. 
 66. Id. at 1250. 
 67. Id. at 1247 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Id. at 1250. 
 69. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added). 
 70. See id. at 1252–53. 
 71. Id. at 1251. 
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because “there is no means to control where geographically . . . 
messages will be received.”72 Because of this fundamental difference, 
distributors sending out alleged sexually explicit material via email 
“cannot tailor their message to the specific communities into which 
they disseminate their speech,” and therefore, the rationale of 
Hamling and Sable is inapplicable to the Internet.73 
In distinguishing Hamling and Sable, the court relied heavily on 
the concurrences of Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer in Ashcroft. 
Both Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer agreed that the burden 
put on distributors by Hamling and Sable “may be entirely too much 
to ask”74 and would in effect provide certain communities with a 
“heckler’s Internet veto” against distributors.75 The court agreed 
with this line of reasoning and was “persuade[d] . . . to join Justices 
O’Connor and Breyer in holding that a national community 
standard must be applied in regulating obscene speech on the 
Internet, including obscenity disseminated via email.”76 The court, in 
effect, accepted the same arguments that both Sable and Hamling 
had previously rejected.77 
B. “Distilling” Ashcroft 
In trying to reconcile the “divergent reasoning” of the Justices in 
Ashcroft, the court determined that “Ashcroft leaves us with no 
explicit holding as to the appropriate geographic definition of 
contemporary community standards to be applied here.”78 Because 
the court determined that Ashcroft gave no applicable majority 
holding, it applied a well-known constitutional rule, found in Marks 
v. United States, which states, “When a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1253 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 587 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 75. Id. (quoting Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 76. Id. at 1254. 
 77. See id. at 1250 (“Defendants’ argument is not an entirely novel one.”). 
 78. Id. at 1253. 
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narrowest grounds.”79 Using this rule, the court began its 
“distillation” process. 
Applying Marks to Ashcroft, the court determined that “five 
Justices concurring in the judgment, as well as the dissenting Justice, 
viewed the application of local community standards in defining 
obscenity on the Internet as generating serious constitutional 
concerns.”80 Additionally, the court determined that “five justices 
concurring in the judgment viewed the application of a national 
community standard as not or likely not posing the same concerns 
[as a local standard] by itself.”81 The court stated it reached these 
determinations by “‘constru[ing] one Justice’s concurring opinion as 
representing a logical subset of the plurality’s.’”82 Accordingly, the 
court determined that three Justices, including Justice Thomas, 
Justice Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that applying either 
local or national community standards would pose no constitutional 
problem in regulating Internet obscenity.83 In the court’s view, 
“None of the remaining justices . . . joined that broad holding.”84 
Instead, Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer agreed only to the 
extent that “a national community standard would likely not pose 
constitutional concerns by itself.”85 The other three concurring 
Justices, including Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Souter, concurred in the judgment only to the extent that “reliance 
on community standards . . . [did] not by itself render [COPA] 
substantially overbroad.”86 However, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence agreed with Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, and Justice Stevens’s 
dissent as to the conclusion that “application of local community 
standards in defining obscenity on the Internet . . . generat[es] 
serious constitutional concerns.”87 Thus, the court’s final tally was 
that six members of the Supreme Court would not apply a local 
community standard to alleged Internet obscenity, while only three 
 
 79. Id. at 1253–54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
 80. Id. at 1254. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002); see id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 87. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254. 
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members of the Supreme Court would apply either a local or a 
national standard. 
V. ANALYSIS 
This Note offers a critique of the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of 
precedent in Kilbride. While a comparison of the relative merits of 
using a national community standard versus a local community 
standard is beyond the scope of this Note,88 the following sections 
argue that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted and followed the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Ashcroft. 
Wholly absent from the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on the issue of 
national community standards is a discussion of Miller.89 Considering 
that Miller formulated the contemporary community standards test, 
it was improper for the court to re-interpret a key aspect of the 
Miller test without any discussion of Miller itself. Rather than 
grapple with Miller, the court proceeded to “distill” a holding from 
Ashcroft. The court improperly manufactured a holding from the 
various opinions in Ashcroft, rather than acknowledging, as the 
Justices did in Ashcroft, that the decision in Ashcroft was a narrow 
one that did not reach the issue of whether a national standard 
should apply to cases of Internet obscenity. 
A. Disregarding Miller and Its Progeny 
Criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of Miller is easy because 
the court failed to cite, let alone discuss, Miller.90 Even a cursory 
reading of Miller makes clear the Supreme Court’s preference for 
using local community standards over national community standards. 
Although the Court held in Miller that national community 
standards may be used to instruct a jury, it noted that structuring 
proceedings in such a way would “be an exercise in futility.”91 By 
 
 88. For a discussion of the merits of the Ninth Circuit’s approach, see Clay Calvert, The 
End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47 
(2010). 
 89. The court does cite Miller when discussing the first of Kilbride’s alternative 
arguments. See supra note 65. However, in the section where the court holds that a national 
standard must apply to obscenity disseminated via the Internet, the court fails to cite Miller 
once. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250–55. 
 90. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1250–55. 
 91. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973). 
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ignoring this clear directive in Miller to avoid national community 
standards, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the seminal case in the area 
of obscenity law.  
When reformulating the traditional approach in a given area of 
law, courts typically criticize and distinguish prior case law. This 
process is especially important when courts decide to divert from the 
well-marked path of other case law.92 Although “stare decisis is not 
an ‘inexorable command’ [for the Supreme Court],” especially in 
constitutional cases, lower courts must sufficiently distinguish the 
case at bar before refusing to apply a prior rule of law.93 In Kilbride, 
the court takes none of the necessary steps to distinguish Kilbride 
from Miller, and thus diverted, without sufficient justification, from 
the path of Miller. It may in fact be true that Miller’s preference for 
local community standards does not provide a workable method of 
assessing Internet obscenity. However, if the Ninth Circuit found 
this to be the case, the court should have squarely addressed Miller. 
The Eleventh Circuit correctly addressed this issue when it stated: 
“[T]he Miller contemporary community standard remains the 
standard by which the Supreme Court has directed us to judge 
obscenity, on the Internet and elsewhere.”94 The Ninth Circuit’s 
neglect in failing to address Miller is significant and undermines the 
court’s decision. 
Although the Ninth Circuit failed to address Miller, the court 
did address two cases decided after Miller, specifically, Hamling and 
Sable. However, the court’s explanation as to why it did not follow 
Hamling and Sable is unpersuasive because the court relies on what 
is essentially “dicta”95 from Ashcroft. As discussed below, the Ninth 
Circuit recognized that Ashcroft is anything but clear.96 Because the 
Justices were so divided in Ashcroft, it was improper for the court to 
rely solely on that case to deviate from Hamling and Sable. Two 
 
 92. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (“[W]e have long recognized that departures from precedent are inappropriate in 
the absence of special justification.” (quotations omitted)). 
 93. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 94. United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 
(unpublished decision). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2009) (making 
the following statements regarding Ashcroft: “[t]he Supreme Court’s fractured decision”; 
“eight Justices . . . applied divergent reasoning to justify the Court’s holding”; and “the 
extremely fractured opinion in Ashcroft” (emphasis added)). 
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important obscenity law principles follow directly from Hamling and 
Sable. First, instructions regarding contemporary community 
standards need not be defined by a “precise geographic area.”97 
Second, distributors of sexually explicit material bear the burden of 
complying with the various community standards when they 
distribute their material.98 Several Justices in Ashcroft either 
questioned or outright rejected these principles in the context of 
obscenity distributed via the Internet.99 However, several Justices, 
including some who questioned the above principles, also admitted 
that defining community standards through a national lens was also 
problematic.100 Thus, Ashcroft did not decisively resolve the issue of 
how to apply contemporary community standards to Internet 
obscenity, and it was a significant overreaching by the Ninth Circuit 
to rely on Ashcroft as if a majority of the Supreme Court had rejected 
Hamling and Sable. 
B. “Distilling” a “Holding” from Ashcroft 
Kilbride’s “distillation” of a “holding” out of Ashcroft is at odds 
with traditional interpretative rules that lower courts follow in 
adhering to Supreme Court precedent. Two rules, established by the 
Supreme Court, should have been used in Kilbride to properly 
interpret and apply Ashcroft. First is the Marks rule, which, as noted 
above, essentially says that if the Court issues a fragmented decision, 
then “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.”101 The second rule, articulated in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., states, “If a precedent of 
[the Supreme Court] has direct application in a case, yet appears to 
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of 
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to 
 
 97. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974). 
 98. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124–26 (1989). 
 99. See supra Part III.B. 
 100. See supra Part III.B.; see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 589 (2002) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[J]urors asked to 
evaluate the obscenity of speech based on a national standard will inevitably base their 
assessments to some extent on their experience of their local communities.”); id. at 602 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“[J]uries will inevitably apply their own community 
standards.”). 
 101. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
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[the Supreme Court] the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”102 In Kilbride, the Ninth Circuit applied the first rule, 
although incorrectly, and failed to apply the second rule. 
The invocation of Marks in Kilbride makes it appear as if the 
only decision the Ninth Circuit could make with regard to 
interpreting Ashcroft is to hold that “a national community standard 
must be applied in regulating obscene speech on the Internet.”103 
However, this is simply not the case. A comprehensive reading of 
Ashcroft shows that the Ninth Circuit did not have to hold that a 
national community standard applies to the Internet. Rather, at best, 
Ashcroft indicates that several Justices would be willing to reevaluate 
the current framework for community standards as applied to the 
Internet at some future date. To illustrate, Justice O’Connor stated 
in her concurrence: “[I]n future facial challenges to regulation of 
obscenity on the Internet, litigants may make a more convincing case 
for [a national standard].”104 Further, Justice Kennedy found that 
“[the Court] need not decide whether the statute invokes local or 
national community standards to conclude that vacatur and remand 
are in order.”105 Statements, such as these, by members of the 
Supreme Court should be indicative of the willingness of those 
members of the Court to reevaluate the national community 
standard issue in the future; they should not be used by lower courts 
to indicate that their opinions may be used as a “holding.”106 
Although Kilbride invoked Marks as the proper rule for interpreting 
Ashcroft, it incorrectly applied Marks to “distill” a holding from 
Ashcroft that was not really there. 
Kilbride also failed to invoke the Shearson/American Express rule, 
as noted above. As a starting point, it is far from clear that Ashcroft 
requires that national standards be applied to Internet obscenity.107 
 
 102. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 103. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 104. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
 106. See Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Adopts National Standard for Internet Obscenity, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2009, 11:38 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/10/29/ninth-
circuit-adopts-national-standard-for-internet-obscenity (“But here the Ninth Circuit is 
counting the number of Justices who had ‘concerns.’ Concerns are not positions. You can’t 
count the number of Justices who had a particular thought and then say that the thought is 
somehow binding on the lower courts.”). 
 107. See discussion supra Parts III.B, V.B. 
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However, even assuming a majority could be “distilled” from the 
various opinions in Ashcroft requiring that national standards be 
applied to Internet obscenity, that fragmented holding would be 
contrary to much of the reasoning in Miller, Hamling, and Sable.108 
At that point, a proper application of Shearson/American Express 
would require that the lower court follow the reasoning in Miller, 
Hamling, and Sable. Then, if the Supreme Court determined that 
the rule should change, it could do so and reverse the lower court.109 
The Ninth Circuit, in Kilbride, overlooked Shearson/American 
Express and thus failed to invoke an important interpretative rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kilbride reads as if the case 
presented a distinct issue from the Miller line of cases and was in fact 
already determined by a “majority” in Ashcroft. However, these 
assertions are incorrect. Miller continues to be the baseline for 
obscenity cases. The reasoning from Hamling and Sable has yet to be 
abandoned by a true majority of the Supreme Court. Additionally, 
Ashcroft was anything but a clear mandate that national community 
standards should be the sole standard to be applied in sexually 
explicit Internet material cases. Regardless of the supposed faults of 
local community standards, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United 
States v. Kilbride failed to follow clear Supreme Court precedent and 
led to an incorrect decision. 
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 108. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 109. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 669 n.1 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(citing Shearson/American Express for the proposition that it is for the Supreme Court to 
determine a variety of questions related to the binding effect of an International Court of 
Justice decision). 
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